North Korea developed nuclear weapons amidst U.S. sanctions, which continued since the Korean War. Sanctions were not a good way to prevent nuclear armament. Actually, it was a bad measure that only encouraged the development of nuclear weapons. The United States does not recognize this historical fact, which has been proven over the past 68 years. It still believes that sanctions were the critical factor that led to the shift toward denuclearization. In a world with this belief, the only option we have when the North Korean nuclear problem is stalled is to enforce stronger sanctions. The longer the sanctions are in place, the greater the suffering of the sanctioned state, and thus the more likely for that country to succumb.

The U.S. made a mistake of betraying this line of thinking. When North Korea first expressed its willingness to dismantle its nuclear weapons, the U.S. demanded that the North dismantle its nuclear weapons in a short period of time, six months to a year. Naturally, North Korea refused. President Trump probably realized it then. "One should not be too hasty. We need plenty of time to force North Korea." This is probably why he said he wouldn’t play time games when refusing Kim Jong-un's tempting proposal to aim for denuclearization in two years. In the press conference shortly after the U.S midterm elections, Trump repeated seven times that he would not hurry. He seems to be memorizing a spell, trying to convince himself. Perhaps, he is trying to cut off any expectations of a change in the U.S. approach to North Korea after the elections, early on.

Now, what the U.S. has to do is wait for North Korea to change. But this approach, doesn't it sound familiar? It was the strategic patience of Obama. Trump would not like to hear that he resembles Obama more and more as time goes by. Is time really on Trump's side and will it guarantee his success?

North Korea has already improved relations with neighboring countries significantly. While the U.S. was in conflict with China and Russia, North Korea found more room to breathe. With the passage of time, North Korea will secure more room for its survival. We will not be able to block this space completely with sanctions. Besides, North Korea has already evolved into a sanction-proof economic system. The North is used to enduring time more than any other state. The U.S. president, vice president and secretary of state are chanting sanctions like a parrot against such a North Korea. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) released a report on November 12 misleading the public into thinking that North Korea was caught hiding thirteen missile bases. Would this scare North Korea and force it to dismantle nuclear weapons? Or would it encourage Pyongyang to resolve not to abandon its nuclear program so easily?

The “sanctions first” policy was more of an alibi due to an awareness of criticism within the U.S. claiming that Washington was "being fooled by Kim Jong-un" rather than a solution to the North Korean nuclear problem. The thought that North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons is a bad act and so negotiating with a North Korea that possesses nuclear weapons is not the right attitude is prevalent in the U.S. They think that a North Korea that has returned to a pre-nuclear state is normal and that negotiating substantial exchanges with a North Korea only under these conditions is desirable. This argument of a restoration of the "original state" is an approach that rejects reality and avoids responsibility. We cannot properly explain the denuclearization of North Korea without the U.S. failure in responding to North Korea in the past.

The realistic view of international politics sees power as the major factor dominating state relations. Needless to say, it is true in the relationship between North Korea and the U.S., which lacks all trust. In a long history of confrontation, the two countries believed in power, not the good will of their opponent. But what would happen if they believed in good will? North Korea took preemptive measures that could be interpreted as an expression of their willingness to denuclearize the nation. The U.S. suspended ROK-US joint military exercises. Trump said he loved Kim Jong-un. The exchange of good will led to reconciliation in the form of a summit between North Korea and the U.S. and an agreement on denuclearization and closer relations.

When the two countries relied on force, they aggravated the North Korean nuclear issue, but when they gave good will a small chance, that alone brought active dialogue and progress in denuclearization. Power called for power, and good will called for good will. Sanctions and pressure are the co-stars, not the stars of denuclearization. With all talks at a standstill as distrust slowly raises its head again in the negotiations on a nuclear declaration and an end-of-war declaration, what we lack now are not more sanctions, but strategic good will. Kwon Jong-keun, director of the U.S. Research Institute under the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs said, "When it comes to active and preemptive measures, we have given the U.S. all we could to a point that it even seems excessive." North Korea hinted at the possibility of a return to its policy of simultaneously pursuing its nuclear program with economic development. The denuclearization train, which ran on the fuel of good will, is running out of good will.

North Korea is not likely to give up its nuclear weapons because of sanctions. If the U.S. plans to force North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons against their will, the only option is war. But if war is not what they want, the only way is to induce North Korea to voluntarily dismantle its nuclear weapons. We cannot leave denuclearization completely up to the good will of North Korea, but without good will, denuclearization is impossible.

Trump needs to know that we have come all this way because of "love," not because of sticks.