U.S. President Donald Trump’s "America First" doctrine has brought a drastic and unapologetic shift in the global order and in how countries conduct diplomacy. While most weaker states have long pursued diplomacy aimed at maximizing national interest, in a world where “every nation for itself” is the norm, pragmatic diplomacy may be the best, or only, option for countries that are not global powers. Korea’s Lee Jae-myung administration is now embracing such a pragmatic, interest-driven approach and appears ready to steer its way through the challenges ahead. President Lee has made it clear that while he will not be intimidated by strongman leaders of major powers, he is willing to swallow his pride for the sake of national interest.

During the Cold War, Korea’s frontline geopolitical position vis-à-vis the communist bloc and its military alliance with the U.S. limited the country’s diplomatic flexibility. Nonetheless, most administrations since the founding of the Republic of korea have practiced pragmatic diplomacy, regardless of ideology or political alignment. Whenever pragmatism aligned with external changes or moral legitimacy, it tended to succeed, as seen in President Roh Tae-woo’s Nordpolitik (Northern Policy), or under President Roh Moo-hyun, in the decision to send troops to Iraq and conclude a free trade agreement (FTA) with the U.S. On the other hand, diplomacy often failed when strategies appeared confused, ideologically extreme, or focused solely on material gain. For example, President Park Geun-hye went as far as to stand atop Tiananmen Gate, but her indecisiveness over the deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) led to the worst period in relations between Korea and China. Under the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, so-called "ideological diplomacy" resulted in a misapplication of pragmatism, costing Korea both its national dignity and national interest.

It is important to distinguish between pragmatist diplomacy and pragmatic diplomacy. Korean diplomacy does not stem from the American school of pragmatist philosophy that emerged in the late 19th century. Instead, it is better understood as a flexible, interest-driven approach, a set of tools or methods for achieving national goals. In that sense, pragmatic diplomacy may be a natural and realistic choice for Korea. However, even for a middle power like Korea, relying solely on pragmatism can do more harm than good. It risks downplaying Korea’s status and global expectations, and it can reduce foreign policy to reactive positioning toward great powers. This is why the new Lee administration must make additional efforts to refine its approach.

First, it must pursue national interest while incorporating uniquely Korean values. Korea’s diplomatic shortcomings have not stemmed from a lack of capability, but from the absence of a value system and strategy that align with its identity and status. The new administration should build a diplomacy rooted in philosophical vision and national dignity, alongside pragmatic goals. Second, Korea must carve out its own space and role in the international arena. As the country’s influence grows, it must pursue “blue ocean” agendas and areas. Korea, as a successful model of democratization and industrialization, must now contribute to the global commons in a manner that reflects its strength and international standing. Third, Korea needs to develop a theoretical framework for its own brand of pragmatic diplomacy. In times of shifting security dynamics, foreign policy changes must be backed by clear rationale and evidence. Without this, Korea risks being perceived as indecisive, calculating, or opportunistic.

Domestic consensus is essential for the legitimacy of pragmatic diplomacy. As a form of centrist diplomacy that transcends ideology and political camps, it can win broad support, but it is also vulnerable to criticism from all sides. Therefore, continuous bipartisan political effort is needed to define the national interest and persuade the public. Persuasion itself is a core element of successful pragmatic diplomacy.

Just weeks after the launch of the new administration, Korean society is already seeing a renewed atmosphere and a shift in its international image. This suggests the potential for a new kind of diplomacy, driven by dynamism, backed by concrete action, and capable of moving hearts. I hope that this administration will establish a Korean model of diplomacy, one defined not by clarity, ambiguity, or pure flexibility, but by strategic stability. It should be a diplomacy of tactical adaptability that flows like water. Rather than a rigid 50-50 balancing act, it should be a diplomacy of long-term equilibrium, adjusted according to the issue and the moment. Korea’s foreign policy must be one of strategic calibration and foresight, which is not chasing short-term gains, but safeguarding the national interest with a long-range view. Such a Korean-style pragmatic diplomacy could become a new model in global affairs.

One minor shortcoming lies in the naming. “National Interest–Driven Pragmatic Diplomacy” would be easier to understand and remember. Pragmatism may be the right path, but there is no need to overly emphasize it. After all, many countries practice pragmatic diplomacy, this is not uniquely Korean, and the term is more of a common noun than a proper one. As the president has already expressed a strong desire to contribute to the international community, I hope that once the Presidential Commission on Policy Planning completes its work, the government will officially announce a foreign policy label that encapsulates its philosophy, vision, principles, and character, with “National Interest–Driven Pragmatic Diplomacy” as a subtitle. Pragmatic diplomacy that is rooted in both dignity and interest is the right direction for Korea. I hope this year will mark the founding year of a distinctly Korean model of pragmatic diplomacy.