“Pursuing a risk-reduction dialogue with DPRK and China is worth a try”

Robert Einhorn, the former Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control at the Department of State poses for an interview with the Kyunghyang Daily News at his office at the Brookings Institution in Washington D.C. where he serves as a senior fellow. Photo credit: Yoojin Kim

By Yoojin Kim, Washington Correspondent

(Editor’s note: This is a full transcript of the interview published exclusively by the Kyunghyang Daily News. Excerpting the entire or any part of the text without consulting the interviewee or the editor is strictly prohibited. Korean version)

Russia’s use of veto over extending the term for the United Nations Security Council(UNSC) Panel of Experts which has monitored the implementation of sanctions against the DPRK‘s nuclear and missile programs for fifteen years, evidently reaffirmed the persistent North Korean conundrum faced by the international society.

Kim Jong Un regime, with its burgeoning de facto military alliance with Russia, is further exacerbating tensions in the Korean peninsula with its series of antagonistic actions toward South Korea. The shadow of the new Cold War seems to linger over the Northeast Asia region along the lines of U.S.-Republic Of Korea-Japan versus Russia-China-DPRK.

The Kyunghyang Daily News spoke with Robert Einhorn, the former Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms Control at the Department of State, once famed as the Death Messenger to DPRK from spearheading sanctions against its illicit nuclear and missile developments.

Einhorn emphasized that while “denuclearization should remain as the ultimate goal” of the U.S. policy towards DPRK, the U.S. government must “focus on the most immediate concern”, which is the possibility of armed conflict and even the escalation of nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula.

In this sense, he called for “a regional and multilateral dialogue on risk reduction” where not only DPRK but China could participate to discuss “confidence-building measures for all parties with equal obligation and commitment”. Given the strained relations between the U.S. and China, this would be a mounting challenge but Einhorn said “probably it is worth a try” considering China’s concerns for Russia-DPRK military nexus that would expedite U.S.-ROK efforts to strengthen extended deterrence.

Q: How concerned are you about Russia’s repeated attempts to undermine the sanctions regime, as illustrated by its use of veto on the extension of the UNSC Panel of Experts(PoE)?

A: The ending of the mandate for the panel is unfortunate. That won‘t affect the sanctions themselves, but there will be less effective monitoring of those sanctions. The benefit of the Panel of Experts is that it was an international body doing the monitoring and that gave it a certain amount of legitimacy and credibility. In the old days, China and Russia were our partners in putting pressure on North Korea. During the six-party talks that China hosted, China cooperated closely with us. So did Russia. During the 2016-2017 period, there was a series of increasingly harsh UNSC sanctions supported by Russia and China. Now, they’re helping North Korea evade sanctions and are prepared to veto any new sanctions.

Q: In the absence of PoE, what measures are possible to continue to enforce and uphold sanctions against DPRK and DPRK-Russia military cooperation?

A: North Korea has been under many sanctions, but unfortunately it has had both China and Russia to help North Korea evade those sanctions. China is the main source of material equipment and food wherever North Korea needs to survive. Some people believe it’s possible to ramp up those sanctions by sanctioning Chinese or Russian entities that are facilitating the evasion of sanctions. But it has political consequences and there’s been some reluctance to go all out in sanctioning North Korea if it involves some of these other measures. So it’s very difficult.

More efforts should be made to sanction North Korea and Russia both to inhibit their trade between themselves but also to inhibit North Korea‘s acquisition of hard currencies and so forth. I know the Biden administration is doing whatever it can in the cyber and the cryptocurrency realm to sanction North Korea and those areas, but it has a long way to go. I’m not optimistic that fundamental differences can be made that can impact North Korea’s destabilizing programs.

Q: What is your assessment of the DPRK’s strategic calculation behind a series of escalatory actions; the adoption of a new nuclear doctrine, the pursuit of a wide range of nuclear capabilities and deepening military ties with Russia, and the rejection of unification with South Korea?

A: North Korea is not interested in talking to the U.S. about denuclearization, or even limited steps toward denuclearization. It simply does not want to accept any limitations on its nuclear and missile capabilities at the present time. Even once it‘s completed its list of ambitious program adopted in Januarty 2021 at the 8th Party Congress, it may not wish to talk to the U.S. Most observers and experts on North Korea believe that this is a strategic shift and unlikely to change.

I think Kim Jong Il believed that North Korean interests could be served by engagement with the U.S. and the West. That’s the impression I received when I met Kim Jong Il, when I was with Secretary Madeleine Albright when she went to Pyongyang. But I don‘t think that’s the attitude of his son. Kim Jong Un tried to see whether it would be possible to engage with the U.S. and he held two and a half meetings with Donald Trump, but the conventional wisdom is that after Hanoi he basically decided that North Korea‘s interests are no longer served by trying to negotiate with the U.S. He responded in a number of ways to accelerate North Korea’s nuclear and missile capabilities, also to realign North Korean policies toward China and Russia and not the U.S.

Q: Please elaborate on your recent proposal that the U.S. should invest more on diplomacy with North Korea, focusing on the goal of risk reduction.

A: I suggested that for the time being, denuclearization can be set aside and instead focus on the most immediate concern, which is that there could be armed conflict as a result of accident or misperception that could escalate to the nuclear level even if nobody wanted it. So it would be desirable to have a dialogue with the North Koreans on risk reduction.

What would be the best way to do that? I think if the U.S. approached North Korea, publicly or through the New York channel, or through China and said that they want bilateral discussions on nuclear risk reduction, North Koreans will say that we‘re not interested in doing so. I think a potentially more promising approach would be to go to China and say ‘Aren’t you interested in reducing the risks of armed conflict, through accident or misperception? Don‘t you believe that the current situation is a bit tense and it could lead to inadvertent conflict? So maybe we should consider a regional forum to deal with reducing the risk of inadvertent conflict and nuclear war?’.

It would be a number of countries, including China, approaching North Korea to have a dialogue about measures that all of us could practice. We’re not just pointing at North Korea for their risk reduction and confidence building measures, but for all of the participants could engage in, where there would be basically equal obligations and equal commitments of everyone. It wouldn‘t even have to be some legally binding formal arrangement. It could be informal steps taken by each of the participants. Will this work? Who knows. But is it worth a try? I think it probably is.

Q: Do you still see a room left for U.S.-China cooperation on North Korean issues, depsite ongoing fierce competition?

A: The Biden administration has approached China many times to work together, saying that since we have worked together closely during the six party talks and in 2016-2017, we have a common interest in avoiding conflict on the Korean peninsula. The response by China each time was that if the U.S. would take more seriously into account China‘s national interests, regarding the Uyghurs, Hong Kong, Taiwan, then perhaps we will work with you. This was very different from the past. Basically they’re saying we have to do China a favor if they‘re to work with us and North Korea.

There‘s been a lot of publicity about Russia providing military assistance in North Korea, to reciprocate North Korea’s shipment of supplies to Russia. China probably is not very happy and would not be very happy if Russia provided sensitive support for North Korea‘s nuclear and missile capabilities, because that support could create instability on the Korean peninsula that China wouldn’t like. If Russia significantly helps North Korea improve the quality of its nuclear and missile forces, the U.S. and the ROK would react by strengthening our own deterrent capabilities, especially in ways that China would not very much like, perhaps strengthen our missile defense capabilities. The Chinese have been opposed to the U.S. increasing its missile defense, not just regional like the THAAD deployments in South Korea, but its homeland defenses. So China also has an interest in Russia not providing sensitive cooperation. That‘s an area of Chinese cooperation that the Chinese would regard as in their own self interests.

Q: Recently, senior U.S. officials including Mira Rapp-Hooper and Jung Pak mentioned the need for ‘interim steps’ when approaching DPRK nuclear issue. While this obviously does not signify a policy shift, do you see any opening for potential dialogues?

A: I think many observers, especially in the ROK overreact when Americans talk about interim steps or limited steps or so forth. In the Trump administration, Steve Biegun in his last engagement with North Koreans in Stockholm suggested that since denuclearization was a long term process and it needs to start someplace, so let’s think of certain near term limitations, which are interim steps. The Trump administration realized that. It‘s not a dramatic Biden administration shift but has been the policy for a long time, including under Trump. Maybe John Bolton was different. So-called Libya model is utterly impractical when talking about a nuclear and missile program that’s expanded as much as the DPRK program is expanded.

Denuclearization can‘t happen overnight. You have to begin the long term process of denuclearization with initial steps, or interim steps or limited steps, call it whatever you want, but these are partial steps. Denuclearization must remain the ultimate objective. But we have to realize that you know, there are problems today. There‘s the risk of war and instability today and we should deal with those problems with interim steps. For the contents of those interim steps, maybe it could be some bans on certain missile tests, nuclear tests or confidence building and risk reduction measures. You have to walk before you can run and you have to take these incremental steps.

Q: You mentioned that some of the components of the Comprehensive Military Agreement(CMA) can be utilized for risk reduction measures, but the CMA has effectively been nullified.

A: There are elements of the CMA that would be very useful to restore. But clearly, after recent statements by Kim Jong Un that ROK is a separate country and the enemy, they are not interested in re engaging with the ROK, I can’t see the restoration of the CMA anytime soon. That‘s why I’m suggesting that multilateral and regional context might be more promising than to try to restore the CMA that the North Koreans only recently suspended. I think the CMA was a good idea. I questioned whether it was a good idea for the South Korean government to do its partial suspension. But we have an expression about don‘t cry over spilled milk. I think trying to reestablish a number of confidence building measures in a multilateral and regional context may be somewhat more promising than trying to do it bilaterally.”

Q: In case of another Trump administration, what are the prospects for the U.S.-DPRK negotiations?

A: It is almost useless to speculate by the North Korean policies of a possible Trump administration. We just don’t know who will be the principal advisors and whether those principle advisors will have any real influence on Trump or whether Trump will develop some ideas in his own head and decide to pursue them.

Would Kim Jong Un and Trump be prepared to re engage again and to consider what may be practical? I tend to doubt it. Trump always asserts self confidently that he can fix these problems, like he’s going to end the war in Ukraine right away. I think whereas Trump may believe that he can finally solve the North Korean nuclear problem, even though he can‘t, Kim Jong Un may be reluctant to engage with him. What I’m saying is we just don‘t know. South Korean journalists have approached many American experts on North Korea and they’ve gotten all kinds of speculation, but they shouldn‘t place any reliance on any of it.

Q: Given Trump’s tendency to view alliances in a transactional and dismissive manner, as you eloquently put it, what will be the impacts of Trump‘s return on U.S-ROK relations including extended deterrence guarantees?

A: Here too, it’s difficult to speculate. But we have we had some track record to consider here, which isn‘t very positive. The first Trump administration made exorbitant demands to South Korea during negotiations around (USFK) cost-sharing agreements. Would the second Trump administration threaten again to withdraw U.S. forces if South Korea didn‘t pay enough? Who knows?

I think the Biden and Yoon administrations made a lot of progress on extended deterrence. The Washington Declaration was a very important document, and it needs to continue and to be built upon. There’ll be a Nuclear Consultative Group meeting in June, where hopefully they will establish certain guidelines and agree to continue the work. Both administrations want to do as much as possible to institutionalize progress in extended deterrence so that it won’t be simply discarded, but will be come to base for further progress. America’s allies in the Northeast Asia and Europe all concerned about Trump. But we can‘t really predict what Trump will do. Some of the signals are there, but who knows with him. I think establishing certain routines, whether it’s in the rotational deployment of U.S. strategic assets, or in high level meetings create the expectation that things will continue moving ahead.

Q: A sizable Korean public still favors the nuclear option, including access to spent fuel reprocessing. How could the U.S. increase credibility in extended deterrence to reassure Koreans?

A: Japan has enrichment technology, but it has not commercialized it because the technology Japan has is not as efficient as the technology from Russia or France. Japan has reprocessing technology with a plant at Rokkasho for over 20 years, but it‘s still not operational. A number of countries including the British have given up processing because it’s not economical.

So I don‘t know that getting into these fuel cycle capabilities is the best approach for South Korea. I think the best approach for South Korea is to work hard with the U.S. to strengthen the extended deterrence, especially to give South Korea a more responsible role in the planning and execution of the extended deterrence, which is being done. The two governments have been working on technical arrangements to ensure that in a nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula, both presidents could consult directly so that South Koreans can have more of a voice in these critical decisions.

At the end of the day, of course, the U.S. president will have the final say on whether or not nuclear weapons should be used. But South Korea should have a significant voice in that decision. I think for the first time, there’ll be an opportunity to do that. I think that‘s the best way to give the South Korean public confidence that extended deterrence will be effective and will protect South Korea and the U.S.-ROK alliance.”